CASE Forum

PfizerWorks: How to Make an Offer That Managers Can't Refuse?

Jordan Cohen, a Pfizer manager, had the makings of a good idea. But selling it internally was another story. How can a middle manager with no positional power convince those at the top that pfizerWorks can work?

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THE CASE

As Jordan Cohen, a Pfizer manager, was leaving his office late one night, he noticed a highly talented colleague furiously working away at his desk, trying to clear his in-tray so it didn’t pile up for the next day. This gave Cohen an idea.

Seeing his colleague stuck in meetings all day, and then working after hours to complete menial tasks, seemed to Cohen a waste of his talents. What’s more, in 2005, Pfizer was in the middle of implementing a sweeping program to standardize processes and improve productivity through a global initiative called “Adapting to Scale.” Cohen felt it was time to see if the pharmaceutical giant was prepared to put its money where its mouth was.

First, he had to get to grips with the scale of the problem. Using his internal network, he convinced 12 volunteers to monitor how they spent their time over a six-month period. The results revealed that the employees were regularly bogged down doing basic data gathering and analysis, and preparing slide shows – tasks for which they were overqualified.

Cohen began brainstorming the best solution. Rather than thinking in terms of existing resources and departmental targets, he wanted to somehow boost the individual productivity of each employee. Inspired by Thomas Friedman’s book, The World Is Flat, Cohen started to wonder: Would it be possible to offshore the grunt work – not by shifting jobs or departments overseas, but by shifting the tasks? In other words, could he create a service that allowed everybody in Pfizer to have their own virtual assistants, hiring them on a per-project basis, as and when needed?

With this in mind, Cohen began to read up on networking, sourcing and contracting with emerging economies. The more he explored, the more he became convinced that his “pfizerWorks” plan could work, but there was one hurdle: As a humble middle manager with no positional power, how was he going to sell his idea to those at the top?

The Idea Takes Shape
To move ahead, Cohen needed a strong team, so he brought together Seth Appel, an external hire with offshoring experience, and Tanya Carr-Waldron, an internal employee who had cultivated a vast network of personal contacts during her 20 years at Pfizer. They set up a pilot program, using a small office in Chennai, India.

Part of the challenge was convincing Pfizer employees to start sending tasks to Chennai. However, talk of “offshoring to India” tended to make people jumpy: Were their own jobs next? This was where their network of trusted contacts came in handy, because Cohen and his cohorts were able to coax 50 people on board who were game for their little experiment.

As things got under way, there were the inevitable hiccups, and Cohen spent a lot of time mollifying people. But even the glitches gave them vital feedback, which enabled them to iron out the kinks in their system. The users of the pilot grew increasingly enthusiastic.

Armed with these results, Cohen felt he had the makings of a business case – but several new questions arose.

First, was the time right to present it to senior management? Getting the green light for the pilot had been relatively easy: His idea fit within the corporate “Adapting to Scale” drive, the budget was small and it wasn’t taking up too much work time. But getting management to roll out pfizerWorks on a grand scale across the organization – well, that was another story. Should he spend another six to 12 months getting it 100 percent right? Just present what he had and perfect it as he went along? Or argue for taking it big, anchoring pfizerWorks as a core service in the organization and investing in building strong capacity in this area?

Second, how should he explain or position the new service to employees? As a cost-saving tool, a productivity aid or something else? And how would he deal with the negative associations with outsourcing?

Finally, what about his personal stakes? If he placed all his bets on pfizerWorks and it flopped, as many innovations do, he could damage his career prospects. On the other hand, putting his own neck on the line could get upper management’s attention and show them that he was serious – though if it went wrong, they might just fire him.

Hear Jordan Cohen discussing the case of pfizerWorks, which is available from IESE Publishing.

WHAT I WOULD DO

rafael, castro
March 19, 2011 08:18:01

1. Vender tangibles versus vender intangibles. Si el perfil de Jordan Cohen es el propio de alguien que sabe vender “productos”, vender intangibles no debería haber mayor problema: Jordan dominará de forma disciplinada y consciente la parte derecha de su cerebro (lobbies, emociones, empatía, rapport, PNL, intuición, tener cortos e interesantes temas de conversación sobre varios temas para distintas audiencias, léxico social moderado y discreto, etc.) Es decir, tener una comprensión global de cómo va a abordar con sus superiores el programa PfizerWorks desde el punto de vista de los códigos comunicativos. Esto le permitirá allanar el terreno antes de proceder a exponerles su idea. Por otro lado, es importante el nivel de entusiasmo. Si Jordan no goza de un verdadero entusiasmo por su idea, la idea no dará frutos. Pero si tiene entusiasmo, lo contagiará, ya que será percibido de forma inconsciente por la alta dirección, lo cual tendrá un efecto directo en la persuasión. En resumen, Jordan debe convertir lo intangible en tangible. Las carencias o deficiencias no pueden ser vistas como un obstáculo, sino como parte de la “tarea a hacer” antes de llegar a alta dirección. Es lo que Philip Kotler llama “marketing interno”. Jordan debe saber que la información recibida por la vista aumenta en un 75% las probabilidades de que sea entendida y digerida por la alta dirección.

rafael, castro
March 19, 2011 08:19:07

2.- Aprendizaje institucional (o modelos mentales). La alta dirección de empresas muy establecidas es muy sensible a la idea de cambiar o nos adaptarse solo cuando experimenta “dolor”. Una mala inversión, un escándalo de la marca, una fuga de talentos, una regulación gubernamental muy adversa o cualquier otro hecho que haga perder clientes o cuotas de mercado son motivos para cambiar. Aquí, Jordan enfrenta a lo que Arie P. de Geus llama los “modelos mentales” de la alta dirección (modelos de la empresa, del mercado y de sus competidores). Si “vende” pfizerWorks en su “versión pura”, va a fracasar. Debe buscar un “móvil” asociado a los modelos mentales de la alta dirección adecuando muy bien su idea para que su “audiencia” pueda entender en “sus términos” y en “su mundo” lo que les va a decir. La idea es que aquellos “no” que Jordan obtenga de la alta dirección deben ser vistos como un aprendizaje institucional y no como otra cosa: cuanto más se acerque su idea a los modelos mentales de la alta dirección (empresa, mercado y competencia), más cerca estará de convencerlos. De lo contrario, deberá revisar su estrategia.
Respecto a la externalización, Jordan deberá averiguar si el modelo mental de la alta dirección se basa en el corto o el largo plazo. En el caso del corto plazo, la empresa se decantará por externalizar para aumentar rápido el valor de la empresa para los accionistas. Para el largo plazo, la empresa preferirá desarrollar las capacidades de la organización mediante el conocimiento interno o know-how, lo que requerirá fuertes herramientas de “gestión del cambio”, ya que el programa va a tocar la zona de confort de muchos empleados y eso hay que gestionarlo.

Cuando se trabaja con “tecnologías disruptivas” mucha empresas optan por crear una unidad piloto a parte, y la experiencia, logros y éxitos de esa unidad es tal, que esa noticia “llega a oídos” del resto de los empleados en calidad de “rumor sano”. Por ejemplo: “el programa pfizerWorks hizo en 1 semana lo que otros hicieron en 4 meses”, “supe que el programa pfizerWorks desarrolló una nueva tecnología”, etc. Estos rumores contagian y allanan el terreno para que cuando el líder lo quiera aplicar a las otras unidades, estas ya sepan que es para mejorar, no para despedir a nadie. Se puede crear como una especie de “protocolo o programa” de inserción al programa pfizerWorks, y, de esta forma, el resto de los empleados se sentirán partícipes del éxito del programa. Al aumentar la demanda, habrá una tendencia a que “bajen” los costes por una posible solicitud de aumento de sueldos, ya que “querrán” entonces “entrar” en el programa pfizerWorks. Por experiencia, creo que se debería “vender” a los empleados el programa bajo la figura de una especie de “certificación”, donde el empleado sienta que “luchó” por estar allí, y no ofreciendo un aumento de sueldo, porque las motivaciones deben ser de índole interna (conocimientos, apoyo corporativo, alineamiento, etc) y no externas (aumento de sueldos, bonos, horas extras, etc.)